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Outline 
l.  Proposal/Introduction 
 1.   Explain and explore reasons for neutrality 
 2.  Combatants- Allied/Axis  
 3.  Neutral countries 
ll.  Ireland 
1. Reason behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
lll.  Portugal 
1. Reasons behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
b. Involvement and dealings with Allied/Axis powers 
lV.  Spain   
1. Reasons behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
b. Involvement and dealings with Allied/Axis powers 
V.  Sweden 
1. Reasons behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
b. Involvement and dealings with Allied/Axis powers 
Vl.  Switzerland 
1. Reasons behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
b. Involvement and dealings with Allied/Axis powers 
Vll.  Turkey 
1. Reasons behind opting for neutrality 
a. Political, social, economic, geographical 
b. Involvement and dealings with Allied/Axis powers 
Vlll.  Conclusion 
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“Political Neutrality in Europe during World War II” 
 
 Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, two days later Great Britain and France 
declared war on Germany for doing so.  Europe would now become a battle ground, with many 
European states/countries being overrun and occupied by Nazi Germany, and their soon to be 
Axis partner- Italy.  The countries that Germany invaded and occupied were many, namely: 
Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, France, Monaco, Yugoslavia, Greece 
(with the help of Italy), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Soviet Union (partial).  But, there 
were countries that opted to remain neutral during World War II.  They were Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.  Three other countries were neutral too, Liechtenstein, 
San Marino and Andorra and the Vatican City, but they will not be included in this paper  
importance as neutral states played were insignificant compared to the aforementioned 
countries I have listed 
 Each of the six countries that I will be focusing on: Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Turkey all vied for some form of neutrality, or non-belligerency during World 
War II.  This paper will explore, examine and explain through the use of an extended literature 
review and secondary analysis why self-determination and sovereignty are motivations for   
these countries to control their own foreign policies, but with the world at war, and the war-
literally- adjacent to them, it became next to impossible not to have some sort of interaction- in 
one way or another with either the Allied or Axis powers, or both at any given time. 
6 
 
 Trade-offs with the warring powers were a key element in maintaining neutrality, 
whether it be in banking and art, use of trade routes and air space, border policies, sales of 
natural resources, human trafficking of refugees, aiding and abetting service personnel, usage 
of ports, or espionage that occurred every neutral country.  Both the Allied and Axis powers 
made use of all of these aspects, and the neutrals appeased them to maintain their neutrality.  
As Herbert R. Reginbogin states, “ A status of neutrality – formally declared – naturally had 
repercussions on a country’s foreign relations.  But the Allied and the Axis powers attached 
different importance to neutral states according to wartime assessments of their importance to 
the war resulting in different standards of respect for the neutrality of different 
states”(Reginbogin, 109). 
 This paper will take a chronological view of each country to (once again) explore, 
examine and explain the how’s and the why’s that they were able to remain neutral. 
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Ireland  
 Very little is written about Ireland’s role as a neutral during the war, as compared to 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and this is to Ireland’s credit.  The Anglo-Irish Treaty 
of 1921 set in motion Ireland’s neutrality as a “political value”  because it gave Ireland its 
independence from Great Britain.  Prime Minister Eamonn De Valera made this a prime moving 
force in establishing an Irish state, and full sovereignty from Britain also (Jesse, 9- 10).  These 
are two important points, because after Ireland got its independence from Great Britain, it was 
then able to pursue its own form of foreign policy.  There are two types of views that have been 
presented as to which platform Ireland chose in establishing its foreign policy-with regards to 
approach to neutrality- realist or liberal theory.  Neal G. Jesse states that “realism explains a 
neutral stance as the rational calculation of a small state’s interest in the state-centered, 
unfriendly, self-help environment.  Liberalism argues that international norms and internal 
dynamics lead nations to seek and maintain neutrality” (Jesse, 8-9).  What this generally means 
is that a realist point of view is more of a generic view on the matter, such as Ireland’s 
(somewhat shielded) geographic location from mainland Europe, and its overall lack of ability to 
involve itself in external conflicts.  Liberalism is based on a more nationalistic foundation 
stemming from a growing desire for self-determination, and distancing itself from the past 
hegemony that Great Britain had had over Ireland prior to its independence.  De Valera also 
viewed Irish neutrality in three ways: as a way to avoid a European war, as a way to avoid civil 
war between the new republic and Northern Ireland, and as a “litmus test of sovereignty” 
(Jesse, 10).  This is not to say that Ireland was entirely anti-Great Britain, because Ireland knew 
that- for its own security and well being- it needed to keep Britain, and the United States (after 
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it entered the war) close at hand for Ireland’s protection. In addition, according to the Anglo-
Irish Treaty, Great Britain had access to certain naval facilities throughout Ireland (Jesse, 11).  It 
should be noted that many Irish citizens enlisted and served England during the war. 
 Ireland took a neutral stand during the war, as did the other five countries, but Ireland’s 
stance of neutrality differs to some degree from the other’s mainly because of it did not directly 
collaborate with Nazi Germany.   
   We can only be a friendly neutral…  Our circumstances, our history, the incompleteness  
   of our national freedom through the partition of our country, made any other policy  
   impracticable.  Any other policy would have divided our people, and for a divided nation  
   to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide. 
 
        Eamon de Valera 14 December 1941 
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Portugal 
 Portugal-much like Ireland- shared a distinct history with Great Britain, except on 
opposite ends of the spectrum.  While Ireland’s history with Great Britain was tenuous- at best, 
Portugal had close political and historical links with Great Britain dating back to the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance of the 14th century (Reginbogin, 127).  However, Portugal also had close 
political and economic ties with fascist Franco’s Spain.  Prime minister Antonio de Oliveria 
Salazar of Portugal had supported Franco during Spain’s civil war, and he had incorporated 
many facets of fascism into his government- including corporatist social and economic policies, 
the debasement of democracy and parliament, an extensive secret police, and a ban on strikes.  
As a result, he and Portugal was viewed favorably by Hitler and Mussolini, as well as by General 
Franco of Spain (Petropoulos, 6).  
 Salazar proclaimed Portuguese neutrality the same day Nazi Germany invaded Poland, 
September 1, 1939.  His decision to do so was based primarily on ideological and economic 
considerations (Reginbogin, 126).  That is, he did not want Portugal to take sides with either 
Britain or Germany.  Moreover, he wanted to protect Portugal’s economic interest, at home 
and its colonial outposts.  Salazar was concerned of a potential invasion from Germany, 
following the fall of France in June 1940.  German troops were stationed less than 260 miles 
from the Portuguese borders.  Salazar was also concerned by the prospects of an alliance 
between Franco and Hitler, which would put German soldiers directly on the Portuguese 
border.  Portugal-with some reservations- did not see itself as high on Germany’s invasion list, 
and continued to maintain its traditional relationship with the United Kingdom.  Before the fall 
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of France, the U.K. had addressed a possible German attack on Portugal, and requested to 
secure bases in the Cape Verde Islands and in the Azores (Reginbogin, 127). 
 By the time the war started in 1939, through 1943, Portugal’s neutrality-and its open 
trade with both Britain and Germany saw the Portugal economy boom.  Portugal went from a 
trade deficit of $90 million in 1939, to a surplus of $68 million by 1943, and assets in private 
banks had nearly doubled, with the Bank of Portugal’s holdings almost tripling (Reginbogin, 
126-27).  This was almost all attributed to the fact that Portugal (along with Spain) had vast 
resources of wolfram ore that were more readily available to Germany than sources further 
east (Wheeler, 108). 
Wolfram is a major source of tungsten, which is a metal used in steel hardening 
processes.  The importance of this mineral-especially during wartime- is that it is used to 
produce machine tools, armor-piercing shells, parts in tanks and airplanes, and parts for 
internal combustion engines (Wheeler, 108).  While war was being waged outside of Portugal, a 
trade war was ensuing inside of Portugal’s borders.  The Allies did not want Germany to have 
access to such a valuable resource, but the Salazar regime interpreted it as a matter of 
“national sovereignty.”  He therefore saw fit to use Portugal’s resources within the confines of 
international and national law, and to maintain its neutrality by attempting to satisfy both the 
Allies and Axis powers and to alienate neither.  The United Kingdom enjoyed a distinct 
advantage over Nazi Germany when it came to purchasing wolfram ore from Portugal, Germany 
had to pay in cash, as where Britain-due to its long standing alliance with Portugal- could pay 
with credit (Wheeler, 110). 
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As the tide of the war started turning in the Allies favor, with victories in North Africa, 
the surrender of Italy, the invasion of mainland Europe on June 6, 1944, plus German defeats in  
the Soviet Union.  In addition, Portugal’s dependence on crude oil and other important 
products from the United States put pressure on the Salazar regime to stop deliveries of 
wolfram ore to Germany (Reginbogin, 130). 
In summary, Portugal used its influence in a natural resource of its own to bargain its 
way as a neutral throughout the war. 
  Every major conflict between a major continental power and a major extra-continental  
  maritime power has found Portugal a bone of contention between the two, if not a 
  battle ground.  …Its security, in consequence, has always depended on its ability to 
  maneuver, to play one force off against the other, to “sell” itself to both belligerents 
  in the capacity of a neutral.  But the success of this policy has depended in turn on the 
  firmness and astuteness of the regime in power in Lisbon.  And this—in view of the lack 
  of a dependable and permanent ruling class—has depended for the most part on  
  chance. 
      (George F. Kennan, Feb. 4, 1943, to Department of 
      State, Washington, D.C.) 
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Spain 
 Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde was the military, fascist leader of Spain 
who had just survived a brutal civil war between his National forces and the republican Popular 
Front government that lasted from 1936 to 1939.  The Popular Front, which favored a 
Marxist/Pro-Russian political system, heavily relied on Russia for military and financial support.  
Franco sought German and Italian military and economic assistance  to stave off the republican 
forces (Reginbogin, 110).  Spain’s civil war was barely over before World War II broke out, and 
the country was in shambles.  Spain’s infrastructure, financial institutions and  people who were 
divided politically and spiritually drained by a costly civil war was in no mood for involvement in 
another war (Beaulac, 4).  Franco knew this, but Spain was deeply in debt to Hitler and 
Mussolini.  When war broke out in September, 1939 he declared Spain a neutral country, even 
though in March of 1939 he had signed a secret friendship and cooperation agreement.  It 
offered Spanish assistance to Germany for the transport of goods from South America through 
Spanish ports (Reginbogin, 112). 
 By June of 1940, Franco had taken a foreign policy stance of non-belligerency, and 
encouraged by German successes led him to believe that an Axis victory was close at hand.  So 
much so, that on June 19, 1940 Franco dispatched a letter to Berlin, stating that Spain was 
prepared to enter the war on the Axis side (Reginbogin, 113).  Hitler was not immediately 
impressed by Franco’s offer since it would have involved “massive deliveries of food and 
military equipment and extravagant promises of imperial spoils at the expense of France.”  
Futhermore, there was…, “overwhelming evidence that Spain would be an economic and 
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military liability (that) convinced Hitler that it was simply not worth the risk of alienating Vichy 
to gain Spanish belligerency” (Preston, 5). 
 On October 23, 1940 Hitler and Franco met for their first and only time in the town of 
Hendaye, which was just over the border in occupied France.  Much was discussed, about when 
and how Spain would enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy.  Franco wanted more 
relief materials sent to Spain to overcome the ravages of its civil war.  He also requested that if, 
and when the time came for Spain to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers, that 
Gibraltar, Morrocco, and Oran would be awarded to Spain.  Hitler balked, because he planned 
to give these to France (Beaulac, 12-13).  Shortly after their meeting in Hendaye, on October 28 
1940, Mussolini-without giving prior notice to Hitler- invaded Greece.  The results turned out to 
be a disaster for the Italians, as they were repelled by Greek forces.  This prompted Hitler to 
issue Directive 18 (dubbed Operation Felix) whch would involve the capture of Gibraltar, and 
the closing of the Straits of Gibraltor.  Hitler summoned Spain’s foreign minister, Ramon 
Serrano Suner, to meet with Hitler at his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden.  Hitler now 
wanted Spain to come on-board in executing Operation Felix, but Serrano reminded Hitler-of 
the Hendaye Protocol- that established that Spain would enter the war when Spain decided, 
and that closing the Mediterranean at Gibraltar meant that the British would close the Atlantic 
to Spain. This act would cut off vital supplies that Spain depended on from overseas, and that 
the Spanish people were just not ready for another war.  Franco vacillated to the point, that 
Hitler shelved his plans for Operation Felix, and moved towards his next objective-Operation 
Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union (Beaulac, 12-16). 
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 This was Franco’s political brinksmanship at his best- playing both ends between the 
middle.  However, he still allowed the refueling and supplying of U-boats, providing radar, air 
reconnaissance and espionage throughout Spain, and the export of valuable raw materials 
(such as wolfram ore) to Nazi Germany (Preston, 2).   
     General Franco’s policy throughout the war was entirely selfish 
      and cold-blooded.  He thought only of Spain and Spanish interests. 
     Gratitude to Hitler and Mussolini for their help never entered his 
     head.  Nor, on the other hand, did he bear any grudge to England 
     for the hostility of our Left-Wing parties.  This narrow-minded tyrant 
     only thought about keeping his blood-drained people out of another  
     war.               Winston Churchill- Their finest hour 
         
  
     .             
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Sweden 
 Unlike Spain, Sweden was a social democracy with roots of neutrality dating back to 
1815 (Logue, 73).  Located on the northern periphery of continental Europe, it shares its border 
with Norway to its west on the Scandinavian peninsula.  Across the Baltic Sea and Gulf of 
Bothnia to the east lies Finland, and to the south lies Denmark and Germany.  When Finland 
was invaded in late November, 1940 by the Soviet Union, Sweden declared itself a non-
belligerent.  Throughout the course-of what would be known as the Winter War, Sweden 
helped resupply Finland with military equipment, and allowed Swedish volunteers to join  
Finland’s cause.  By doing so, Sweden’s stance of neutrality was strained to the limit.  It was 
relieved when Finland surrendered in March of 1940, but a more challenging situation 
presented itself when on April 9 Germany invaded Denmark and Norway.  Denmark fell quickly, 
but Norway fought on for two months in its northern regions with British help.  The threat of a 
German invasion of Sweden seemed imminent (Logue, 84).   
 The reason Hitler invaded Norway was to deny Great Britain a foothold in the region, 
and to keep the Baltic and North Sea open thereby securing a trade route for Sweden’s iron ore 
to Nazi Germany.  Attacking Sweden would have interrupted these deliveries, plus it would 
have taken a large contingency of German forces to accomplish this task.  It was a large country 
and the Swedish defense forces had been bolstered since 1939.  It could not indefinitely hold 
off a German invasion, but it was better prepared than both Norway and Denmark.  Lastly, with 
the attack on France looming, Hitler did not want to spread his forces too thin (Hagglof, 159-
60). 
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 Needless to say, Sweden was still in a precarious situation with regards to Nazi 
Germany, and on July 8, 1940 Sweden signed a transit agreement with Germany allowing the 
shipments of German goods and personnel through Sweden to Norway, and Swedish goods and 
resources to the Third Reich.  Sweden’s claim of neutrality was not only questioned on land, but 
in the air and on the sea.  Sweden allowed unarmed German military planes to fly over 
restricted air space, and allowed German and Finnish vessels to transit Swedish territorial 
waters (Reginbogin, 139-40).  It should be noted that Sweden also traded with the Allies, but to 
a lesser degree as it was hamstrung by having to appease German interests first, and to keep its 
economy afloat. 
 By 1943 the tide was turning in favor of the Allies, and pressure was being exerted on 
Sweden to curtail- if not halt- its trade with Germany.  Sweden was still dependent on trade 
with Germany, but on September 23, 1943 an agreement between the Allies and Sweden was 
reached it would allow shipments of crude oil, rubber and other necessities to Sweden if  it 
agreed to a number of things.  These included that Sweden would prohibit troop movements 
and German war materials, reduce iron ore exports, to stop the Swedish navy from escorting 
German merchant vessels in the Baltic, and decrease its shipments of ball bearings to Germany 
(Reginbogin, 145-46). 
 It should be noted that prior and throughout the war, the people of Sweden were anti-
Nazi, and pro-Allied- even though their actions- from a neutral stand point might seem 
contradictory.  The acceptance of refugees into Sweden from neighboring Norway numbered 
about 44,000 and over 7,000 Jews were saved from Denmark.  Efforts by the likes of Swedish 
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diplomat Raoul Wallenberg saved tens of thousands of people in Hungary, as did Count Folke 
Bernadotte who rescued from Himmler’s death camps approximately 30,000 Jewish men, 
women and children.  In addition, with Swedish assistance between 15,000 and 25,000 Jewish 
lives were saved (Reginbogin, 149). 
     There is certainly nothing in the history of the second World War to  
     support the belief, if this belief still exists, that neutrality is a magic 
     prescription, or, if you prefer it, a juridical formula, banning the 
     danger of war.  On the contrary, the history of the second World War 
     proves, if anything, the precariousness of neutrality. 
        M. Gunnar Hagglof 
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Switzerland 
Switzerland, like Sweden, dates its neutrality back to 1815 with the Treaties of Vienna 
and Paris (Ross, 25).  Both countries were social democracies, and believed in neutrality fighting 
for defensive purposes only.  So, with the advent of war looming, Switzerland felt the need to 
bolster its military capabilities.  Almost four billion francs were spent for weapons, ammunition 
and the construction of redoubts (defensive barriers) along Swiss borders, and throughout the 
Alps.  With the fall of France in June 1940 the threat of invasion intensified as the country was 
now completely surrounded by the Axis powers.  Hitler and his military staff drew up several 
plans for the invasion of Switzerland between the months of August and October 1940.  Most 
notable of these plans was Operation Tannenbaum and Operation Switzerland which differed in 
the amount of force necessary to carry out Germany’s invasion plans and how long the 
campaign would last.  The German’s knew that the Swiss would put up strong resistance, 
especially in the Alps and surrounding forested areas.  Also weighing heavily on Hitler’s 
intentions was the thought of the Swiss destroying two valuable rail lines that ran through the 
Simplon and Gotthard passes which transverse through the Alps.  After contemplating what 
desired effect invading Switzerland would bring, Hitler decided to forego any military action 
because it would have tied up too much of Germany’s war machinery and man power. Greater 
attention was being focused towards the invasion of Great Britain, and soon the Soviet Union. 
In any case, Hitler believed that after Germany’s eventual victory, Switzerland would just fall 
“into the lap of the Third Reich”(Halbrook, 135; Reginbogin, 53; Senn, 63,67). 
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 Much as been mentioned about Switzerland’s trade with Germany during the war 
despite its neutral status.   The 1907 Hague Conventions 5 and 13 spelled out the rights and 
duties of neutral nations when it came to the sales of weapons to belligerent countries.  Only 
private firms were allowed to enter into these transaction(s) according to international law, and 
Switzerland abided by these rules (Halbrook, 155).  The Swiss did sell arms to Britain and France 
also, but when France fell in 1940, Switzerland was completely surrounded by the Axis powers, 
and its business dealings- with regards to weapons- dramatically increased with the Nazis.  In 
return, Switzerland received needed supplies of coal, petroleum products and raw materials to 
keep its factories open and unemployment down.  Germany was also able to obtain weapons 
on credit, which was a reversal of policy of its cash only prior to the fall of France.  This bent the 
rules of neutrality (Vagts, 105,95). 
 As trade with Nazi Germany was a focal point during and after the war, so was the Swiss 
financial dealings with the Third Reich.  The Nazi’s enormous conquest early in the war also 
resulted in enormous seizures of the conquered country’s central assets, e.g., gold.  The 
regulations associated with the 1907 Hague Convention- specifically Article 53- spell out that 
“an army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which 
are strictly property of the State.”  In other words, “to the victor belong the spoils.”  But, Article 
46 states that “private property cannot be confiscated.”  Then Article 55 relates that “limits 
occupying states in their utilization of the wealth of defeated countries to that of a 
usufructuary, that is, a life tenant.  Taking the wealth of an occupied country in such a way as to 
deprive it permanently of these resources might violate that provision”(Vagts, 111-112).  This 
raises speculation as to what role- exactly- did Switzerland play with its financial dealings with 
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Germany during the war.  It’s hard to say who may have profited in these matters, but the 
Washington Accord of 1946 involved the Swiss in the settlement of gold claims in the amount 
of 250 million Swiss francs that went “to the pacification and reconstruction of Europe”(Vagts, 
112). 
 Switzerland is the birthplace of humanitarian organizations such as, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (est. 1863), and the Geneva Convention (est. 1864), and it is 
through these forms of neutrality that shined a positive light on the Swiss during World War II.  
The ICRC with its 3,700 members rendered services/aid to approximately 7,000,000 prisoners of 
war and 175,000 civilian internees.  They would “bring provisions and medical supplies, 
establishing contacts, seeking out identities, informing and reassuring family members if 
possible, and promoting the application of the Geneva Convention.  They made 600,000 
investigations, filled out 50 million forms, and delivered 100 million letters and 33 million 
packages weighing 400,000 tons and worth 3 billion Swiss francs.  Added to this figure were 
750,000 packages distributed to persons deported to concentration camps” (Chevallaz, 177-
178).  It should be noted that the Swiss are a multi-cultural society composed mainly of 
German, French, and Italian speaking cantons. The combination of having adverse culture, and 
being neutral, ad the humanitarian efforts of the ICRC, one would think that the Swiss would 
have been more accommodating to Jewish refugees seeking safe haven from Nazi war 
atrocities as these were common knowledge in Switzerland.  The Swiss government even went 
so far as to persuade the Germans to stamp a “J” on the passports of German Jews.  
Switzerland’s policy for asylum centered around political persecution, and not race or religion.  
As a result, in 1942 some 20,000 Jewish refugees were refused asylum in Switzerland, and 
21 
 
turned back.  The general attitude held in Switzerland- is illustrated by, Federal Councilor 
Edouard von Steiger in 1942 when he said, “When one is in command of a rescue boat that is 
already fully loaded with no extra space and is provided with a limited quantity of food, and 
when thousands of victims of a maritime catastrophe are calling for help, one can appear 
heartless if one does not take everyone on board.  However, one would be even more humane 
by warning people in time against deceptive hopes and by trying to save the ones already taken 
aboard” (Chevallaz, 182).  Ironically, it has also been reported that Switzerland- through the 
course of the war, took in as many as 400,000 refugees and internees.  (Reginbogin, 93; 
Schindler, 157-158; Vagts, 109). 
   What saved Switzerland from occupation and war with the Germans were these factors: 
   the spiritual and political will to resist, integral neutrality, defensive armed prepared- 
   ness, economic exchange with both warring parties, negotiating skills, and luck. 
        Hugo Butler 
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Turkey 
Turkey’s role as a neutral country during World War II was similar and different from 
that of the other neutral’s.  Turkey had signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance (also referred to as 
the Tripartite Alliance) with Great Britain and France on October 19, 1939.  This was out of 
concern “to protect the trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean and into the Black Sea” and 
to quell Germany’s influence on the Turkish economy.  Germany’s keen interest in trading with 
Turkey, was its chrome ore which was of high value in the production of armaments.  Great 
Britain and France pressured Turkey to forego its neutrality and side up with the Allies, as 
Turkey controlled access to the Black Sea, and was bordered by three continents.  Germany and 
the Soviet Union- on the other hand-wanted Turkey to remain neutral (Reginbogin, 156-157). 
 President Roosevelt implemented the Lend-Lease Act on March 31, 1941 that lent 
assistance militarily to Britain, Greece and Turkey.  Turkey’s allotment of military supplies 
would be administered by Great Britain, which sought to sway with Turkey in a positive 
manner.  This did nothing to nullify Turkey’s on-going trade with Germany, and “… as with the 
Swiss case- (it) was not a question of loyalty but a question of the country’s right to secure 
essential goods needed by its population regardless of where they came from” (Reginbogin, 
158).  If the Allies knew how important chrome ore was to the making of Germany’s war 
machinery, World War II might have ended as much as ten months earlier according to a memo 
sent to Hitler on November 10, 1943 from Albert Speer, Minister for Armament and 
Ammunition.  Hitler also planned to invade Turkey after the defeat of the Soviet Union for the 
very purpose of securing chromite ore.  But the Soviet Union was not defeated, and in the 
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spring of1944 Turkey announced that it would terminate chrome ore  trade with Germany 
altogether (Reginbogin, 159). 
 The banking industry in Turkey, specifically the transactions of gold from Germany into 
the German banks in Turkey was a lucrative business.  Transfers of gold from Zurich into the 
Deutsche Bank in Istanbul were then converted to Reichsmark checks issued to diplomats.  
After Turkey balked at the issuance of these checks into their banking institutions, the Deutsche 
Bank would send them to Zurich where they were exchanged for Swiss francs subsequently, 
they would be used to buy gold that was eventually shipped to Istanbul and sold on the open 
market.  The total estimates of these transactions during World War II are hard to pinpoint 
because most occurred between Turkish private banks and individual buyers.  However, but it 
was assessed that between 10 to 15 million dollars worth of gold flowed through Turkey.  After 
the war ended, the Allies tried to recoup some of the gold that had been looted by the Nazi’s 
from the conquered and occupied countries of, but their attempts fell on deaf ears from the 
Turkish government, and nothing was ever recovered (Reginbogin, 163-164). 
 After much prodding by the Allies for Turkey to enter into the war on their side, the 
Turks eventually did so on February 23, 1945 by declaring war on Germany. 
     The main intent of Turkey’s ‘neutrality’ policy during the Second 
     World War was to preserve the human and natural resources of 
     Turkey. 
        Selim Deringil    
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Conclusion 
 
      
It has been estimated that over 60 million people lost their lives throughout the course 
of World War II, along with untold destruction of every participants country (with the exception 
of the United States).  So, we can pretty much ascertain “why” a country would want to be left 
out of direct conflict in this, or any war for that matter.  Some of the neutrals- Sweden and 
Switzerland for example, had longstanding and historical ties to neutrality, so it only stood to 
reason that this would be their course of action when war broke out.  But, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Turkey did not and they also maintained a stance of neutrality also.  Numerous 
countries in Europe proclaimed neutrality prior to World War II, but they were overtaken and 
occupied by Nazi Germany regardless.  How were these six countries able to remain neutral, 
out of direct conflict, and virtually unscathed throughout the war?  You could point to treaties 
and conventions that stipulated one’s neutrality, but in my estimation-for all intents and 
purposes, these are just pieces of paper.  Similar to a restraining order of today, “You are 
hereby ordered by this court to stay 200 feet away from this person.”  If a person has a beef 
with you, no piece of paper is going to stop him or her from getting to you- if they want to.  So, 
treaties and such are nice on the surface, but in reality carry little weight. 
 Throughout my research on this topic I’ve come to a simple conclusion about a 
complicated matter.  These six countries were able to stay neutral by persevering to appease 
(especially) the Nazi’s in the form of one trade-off or another; their geographical location and 
importance; timing and/or circumstances, and a helluva lot of luck. 
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Neutral Countries in Europe during World War II 
Source: Wikipedia 
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